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Abstract
This paper addresses the issue of why Keynesian economists have had such a hard time in giving the concept of
involuntary unemployment a place in economic theory. Is the gradual demise of this concept a manifestation of
some inner defect in economic theory or is it due to some intrinsic weakness in the concept itself, which limits its
usefulness when it comes to economic theorising? I have recently published a book  which attempts to answer
this question, and my aim in this paper is to present its main results. I start by characterising Keynes's
programme  as  consisting  of  the  following  four  elements:  1)  demonstrating  the  existence  of  involuntary
unemployment;  2)  demonstrating  that  wage  rigidity  can  be  exonerated  as  its  cause;  3)  giving  a  general
equilibrium or interdependency explanation of the phenomenon; 4) demonstrating that demand stimulation is the
proper remedy for the problem. Next, I bring out four conceptual ambiguities that have plagued discussions
about involuntary unemployment: the confusion between involuntary unemployment and underemployment; the
confusion  between  involuntary  unemployment  in  the  individual  disequilibrium  sense  and  involuntary
unemployment in the frustration sense; a loose understanding of the notion of full employment; and, finally, a
less than rigorous definition of the notion of rigidity. The paper continues by presenting my arguments on
whether different types of New Keynesian models (implicit contracts, efficiency wages, coordination failures
and imperfect competition) have succeeded in achieving Keynes’s programme. My conclusion is that they all fail
on at least one of its items. In the final section of the paper, I speculate on whether it is still worthwhile for
economists with a Keynesian inclination to keep fighting in defence of involuntary unemployment.
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1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to present the results of a research project on which I have been
working for almost ten years, and was finalised in a book recently published by Routledge
entitled Involuntary Unemployment: the Elusive Quest for a Theory (De Vroey, 2004). It
offers a history of macroeconomics from Keynes’s General Theory to neo-Keynesian models,
tackling this broad subject from the specific angle of the involuntary unemployment concept.
The puzzle that my book tries to solve can be put as follows: why is it that Keynesian
economists, who felt that a concept such as involuntary unemployment had a definite real-
world relevance  in the Great Depression certainly, but also in subsequent, less dramatic,
states of the economy  have had such a hard time giving it a place in economic theory?
What are the stumbling blocks that this enterprise encountered? In other words, why did
Lindbeck and Snower have to make the following comment:
Strange as it may seem to the layman, economists have found it difficult to agree on what
should be meant by involuntary unemployment and to pose coherent arguments that show
why  people  who  are  willing  and  able  to  work  at  the  prevailing  wages  in  market
economies cannot find jobs when they seek them. … Economists have had a difficult
time explaining how involuntary unemployment comes about and may it may persist for
substantial periods of time. They appear to have gone through all the various behaviours
that doctors exhibit in the face of unresponsive patients: scepticism, diagnosis, refinement
of the diagnosis, finding reasons for doubt, retracting the diagnosis, pronouncing the
problem non-existent, formulating a new diagnosis, and so on (Lindbeck and Snower,
1988: 19).
For  years,  this  notion  of  involuntary  unemployment  stirred  up  heated  controversies,
generating polar  opposite standpoints. The following quotations, from Mancur Olson and
Robert Lucas, illustrate this point:
There are, of course, large numbers of people who voluntarily choose not to work for pay
(such as the voluntarily retired, the idle rich, those who prefer handouts to working at
jobs, those who stay at home full time to care for children, and so on) and, given the way
unemployment statistics are gathered in the United States and other countries, no doubt
some of these show up in the unemployment statistics. But common sense and the
observations and experiences of literally hundred of millions of people testify that there is
also  involuntary  unemployment  and  that  it  is  by  no  means  an  isolated  or  rare
phenomenon. … Only a madman  or an economist with both ‘trained incapacity’ and
doctrinal passion  could deny the reality of involuntary unemployment. (Olson,
1982:195)2
Involuntary unemployment is not a fact or a phenomenon which it is the task of
theorists to explain. … It does not appear possible, even in principle, to classify
individual  unemployed  people  as  either  voluntary  or  involuntarily  unemployed
depending on the characteristics of the decision problem they face. One cannot, even
conceptually, arrive at a usable definition of full employment as a state in which no
involuntary unemployment exists. ( Lucas, [1978] 1981: 243)
Although it was already in use before Keynes’s General Theory, the concept of involuntary
unemployment came to prominence in this book. Keynes went to great pains to define it and
dissociate  it  from  other  types  of  unemployment.  He  claimed  to  have  succeeded  in
demonstrating the possibility of its existence, and most commentators took him at his word.
Involuntary unemployment found a place in macroeconomics textbooks without its validity
being questioned. Gradually, however, the standard use of the concept, as well as the broader
framework in which it was embedded, began to be questioned. The criticism came from two
distinct directions. First, there were authors (such as Patinkin, Clower, Leijonhufvud and
subsequent disequilibrium economists) who wanted, as it were, to salvage Keynes’s central
message from what it had become in standard Keynesianism. The second line was more
deeply anti-Keynesian, consisting of a two-stage attack bearing both on the conceptual
consistency of Keynesian theory and the efficiency of its policy prescriptions. It was initiated
by Friedman in his American Economic Association Presidential Address (Friedman, 1968),
with  the  fiercest  blows  being  struck  later  by  Lucas  and  his  colleagues. Involuntary
unemployment was not the central target of their attack, but it became a collateral victim.
Unsurprisingly, the new classical attack on Keynesian economics did not put an end to the
debate. On the contrary, by a standard dialectical effect, it stirred up a revival of Keynesian
thought, known as “new Keynesian economics”. For better or worse, these authors agreed to
wage the battle on the field decided by the new classicists, i.e. to respect the so-called
‘equilibrium discipline’. In a first stage, they reacted by constructing new involuntary
unemployment models, which could no longer be criticised on the grounds of their lack of
micro-foundations. However, while still claiming that the functioning of the market system
could be beset by market failures, they gradually ceased to put the defence of involuntary
unemployment at the top of the agenda, thereby implicitly giving in to the Lucasian criticism
that theoretical conversations would lose nothing by dispensing with it. To date the opponents
of the introduction of the involuntary unemployment concept in economic theory have had the
upper hand.
These are the intellectual events that my book explores. I am of course unable to enter into a
detailed analysis of the different episodes of this story within the scope of this paper. My aim
is rather to present a few central lessons from my inquiry. This paper is organised in eight
sections, as follows. Section 2 offers a reconstruction of Keynes’s programme. Sections 3 to 53
bring out three conceptual ambiguities which, in my opinion, have played a crucial role in the
misunderstandings that have plagued discussions on involuntary unemployment (as my book
is mainly concerned with conceptual issues, so too is this account). In Section 3 I reflect on
the meaning of the involuntary unemployment notion, emphasising the need to distinguish it
from the underemployment notion. In Section 4 I bring out the ambiguities of the notion of
full employment taking a prominent ‘old’ Keynesian involuntary unemployment model, that
proposed by Modigliani, as an illustration. In Section 5 I ponder upon the opposite notions of
flexibility and rigidity. In Section 6 I discuss the issue of whether New Keynesian models
have succeeded in demonstrating involuntary unemployment. Finally, in Section 7 I wonder
whether it is worthwhile for present day Keynesian economists to keep fighting in defence of
involuntary unemployment.
2. Keynes’s programme: a reconstruction
Keynes’s aim in the General Theory was to provide a theory of the existence of involuntary
unemployment. This, he recognised, was a phenomenon whose real-world existence was self-
evident, but for which no place existed within economic theory. Bridging this gulf was the
task he set himself. However involuntary unemployment was just one element in a broader
picture. Dozens of books aiming to fill the holes in Keynes’s reasoning have been written;
none of their proposed interpretations have gained unanimous acceptance. Nonetheless a
standpoint must be taken as to the nature of this broader picture. Mine is as follows.
The common explanation of unemployment in Keynes’s time was that it resulted from the
wage level being too high and failing to adjust to states of excess supply. Such an explanation
was part of a Marshallian analysis in which one market, here the labour market, was
considered in isolation from the rest of the economy. Keynes wished to escape from this
framework. He wanted to discharge wages being too high from any responsibility for the
existence of involuntary unemployment. In other words, the explanation for involuntary
unemployment had to be located outside the labour market. What Keynes was actually
striving for was to move the analysis of unemployment from a partial to a general equilibrium
or interdependency framework (although this terminology did not exist at this time, and of
course it was not Walrasian general equilibrium that he might have had in the back of his
mind). In other words, Keynes viewed involuntary unemployment as expressing some system
failure, a malfunctioning of the decentralised economy. Its existence had to temper, if not
upset, the optimistic interpretation of the system put forward by many economists since Adam
Smith. In particular, Keynes wanted to link involuntary unemployment with a deficiency in
aggregate demand, itself associated with some leakage from the productive towards the
financial sector.4
Moreover, Keynes did not want to join the imperfect competition line of argument which was
emerging at the time in Cambridge. He wanted to put his argument in terms of perfect
competition  possibly because he associated imperfect competition with collusion, unions,
etc., whereas he wanted to bring to the fore some deeper systemic features of the economy.
Finally, as far as policy was concerned. Keynes believed that a remedy existed for the flaw in
the economic system that he had striven to display, and that it was not lowering wages. To
him the government certainly had an active role to play. For all Keynes’s evasiveness on this
point, the interpretation (which quickly became popular) that the appropriate remedy was
state-induced demand stimulation, seems appropriate. The rationale for this view is that
demand activation follows from the diagnosis that Keynes posited, namely that involuntary
unemployment resulted from aggregate demand deficiency. The latter implies demand
activation as its remedy!
To summarise, Keynes’s research programme consisted of the following items:
1) demonstrating the existence of involuntary unemployment
1a) with an individual disequilibrium connotation (the reason for this qualification
will be explained below);
2) demonstrating that wage rigidity can be exonerated as its cause;
3) giving a general equilibrium or interdependency explanation of the phenomenon
3a) within a perfect competition framework;
4) demonstrating that demand stimulation is the proper remedy to solve the problem.
Moreover, this programme had to be realised in a methodologically correct way, that is, by
departing from the canonical neoclassical model as little as possible.
The main task undertaken in my book is to assess a series of Keynesian models against this
programme. I start, of course, with the General Theory, and continue by studying Hicks’s
IS−LM model, its recasting by Modigliani in his 1944 article, the views on involuntary
unemployment held by the first generation of Keynesian economists (Lange, Leontief, Tobin,
Klein and Hansen) and a few macroeconomic textbooks of the 1960s. Next, I study the
writings of disequilibrium authors (Patinkin, Clower, Leijonhufvud, Barro-Grossman, Drèze,
Benassy and Malinvaud). An examination of the anti-Keynesian offensive led by Friedman
and Lucas, follows. Finally, the last part of the book deals with seminal New Keynesian
models, investigating whether they are able to give a solid demonstration of either involuntary
unemployment or underemployment.  Azariadis’s  implicit  contract  model,  Shapiro  and
Stiglitz’s shirking model, Lindbeck and Snowers’ insider/outsider model, three types of
coordination failure models (Diamond, Howitt and Roberts), and two types of imperfect
competition models (Hart, and Blanchard and Kiyotaki) are considered.5
3. Defining involuntary unemployment and differentiating it from underemployment
According  to  standard  microeconomic  theory,  the  fact  that  an  economic  agent  is  not
participating in the labour market is not a problem. It must simply be the case that the
prevailing wage is lower than or equal to his or her reservation wage (i.e. the lowest wage at
which an agent will be ready to forego one unit of leisure time). This is called the ‘reservation
wage principle’. The existence of involuntary unemployment can then be seen as a violation
of this principle. It occurs when agents are unemployed despite the fact that the market wage
exceeds their reservation wage. According to the first-order condition of their decision
problem  the equalisation of the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
leisure with the real wage rate  they should be participating in the labour market, but they
are not. Nonetheless trading, rather than an adjustment in the wage rate, is occurring. Put
differently, at the wage/employment mix characterising effective trading, some suppliers are
‘off  their  supply  curve’  and  rationed.  Market  non-clearing  and  the  breaching  of  the
reservation wage principle are thus two sides of the same coin. This definition can be traced
back to Chapter 2 of the General Theory, where it is pinpointed by Keynes as a violation of
the second classical postulate.
I want to argue that this definition amounts to describing somebody who is involuntarily
unemployed as being in a state of individual disequilibrium. To this end, the standard notion
of optimising behaviour needs to be qualified by driving a wedge between the ideas of
optimal planning and optimising behaviour.
The optimal plan refers to agents’ solutions to the choice problem they are facing. The plan is
formed before the opening of trading, and is expressed in their individual supply or demand
schedules. In contrast, optimising behaviour refers to what is observed after trading has
started. Thus, optimising behaviour implies that the optimal plan has come through. My point
is that optimal choice and optimising behaviour need to be logically separated  finding a
solution to a choice problem and implementing it are not the same thing.
Individual equilibrium exists whenever the action of a given agent during a given trade round
turns out to be the execution of his or her individual optimising plan as decided at the
beginning of the trade round. Individual disequilibrium refers to a situation where this is
untrue. It thus means the inability of some agents to transform their optimal plans into
optimising behaviour.
In this light, involuntary unemployment must be viewed as the emblematic case of individual
disequilibrium, a case of ‘forced leisure’, as opposed to ‘chosen leisure’. The unemployed, the
argument runs, are deprived of the capacity normally attaching to every economic agent to
participate  in  the  interactive  democratic  process  through  which  market  outcomes  are6
generated. Excluded from the opportunity to work, such individuals are cast aside by the
market system, through no fault of their own. Therefore, the ‘involuntary’ modifier seems
perfectly appropriate.
The definition of involuntary unemployment as a breaching of the reservation wage principle
also has the merit of bringing out the fact that unemployment is a phenomenon of disparity,
marked  by  a  split  between  the  employed  and  the  unemployed.  It  exists  when  total
employment is unevenly distributed across agents, and it affects a proportion of the active
population  the unemployed  without affecting the employed.
Defining a concept in the correct way is certainly a good first step for a theory, but it is
nothing  more  than  that.  Unfortunately,  constructing  models  which  can  demonstrate
involuntary unemployment defined in this way has proved to be a daunting task (unless, of
course, the assumption of an exogenous wage floor is made). I show in my book that neither
Keynes nor the first generation of Keynesian economists achieved this aim.
Actually, the task has proved so daunting that most of the models which arose later on, and
which can be considered as having succeeded in demonstrating involuntary unemployment as
a breach of the reservation wage principle, did so by ignoring the individual disequilibrium
connotation  of  involuntary  unemployment  and  instead  stressing  the  connotation  of
frustration. That is, the involuntarily unemployment agents are depicted as jealous of the
employed ones, but their unemployment is viewed as the result of a lottery which it was
optimising behaviour to enter. If they are victims, they are victims of bad luck.
Let me now come to the underemployment concept which, I claim, cannot be confused with
involuntary unemployment. In its most general sense, underemployment means a state where
the employment level is sub-maximal. When this broad definition is taken, involuntary
unemployment turns out to be a sub-category of underemployment. However, things are
clearer if underemployment is understood in a narrower way as meaning any state of sub-
maximal employment except involuntary unemployment. Whenever underemployment is
defined in this way, it goes along with market clearing. As a result, the idea of individual
disequilibrium is excluded from it. Thus, the reservation wage principle is maintained.
Nonetheless, underemployment so understood expresses  a  state  of  sub-optimality.  The
underlying idea is that the employment level endogenously reached by the economy is
deemed to be inferior in welfare terms with respect to some higher level, attainable only
through exogenous action.
Several authors, starting with Haavelmo (1950), have used the involuntary unemployment
concept to drive a wedge between the optimal and the effective level of employment. It is true
that involuntary unemployment, in the underemployment sense, captures an idea that must
certainly have been attractive to Keynes and is still attractive to Keynesian economists: that it
is related to a systemic flaw associated with the decentralised nature of the decision making7
process in capitalist economies rather than to wages being too high. Nonetheless, I find this
terminology inappropriate. The involuntary modifier makes sense only in a loose way as
referring to some inability to achieve a welfare  dominating higher level of employment.
Moreover, the co-existence of two different meanings of involuntary unemployment cannot
but be a source of confusion since it implies that the same term is used for two distinct
occurrences  one in which the reservation wage principle is breached, and another in which
no such breaching occurs. Finally, models demonstrating involuntary unemployment in this
sense fail to come to grips with the uneven distribution of total employment across agents,
deemed to be a central feature of unemployment. In these models, every agent wanting to
participate in the labour market does so in an optimising way  no individual disequilibrium
is present. It is just that their participation could be increased through exogenous actions. So
what is called involuntary unemployment has nothing to do with joblessness  i.e. people
who are totally out of work  whereas the initial motivation for the research was to give a
theoretical account of this phenomenon. In short, we have arrived at models of involuntary
unemployment from which unemployment, strictly understood, is absent! For all these
reasons, the underemployment definition of involuntary unemployment is wanting.
A compounding factor is that a sub-maximal level of employment is not necessarily sub-
optimal. Hence an additional distinction between two types of underemployment must be
made,  separating  what  could  be  called  ‘dominated underemployment’  from  ‘efficient
underemployment’. The former refers to cases corresponding to the characterisation above,
where the existing level of employment is both non-maximal and sub-optimal. Efficient
underemployment designates cases where the existing level of employment is non-maximal
but optimal  reaching a higher level of employment would not increase agents’ utility.
Clearly, only states of dominated underemployment can be of interest to economists wanting
to denounce some market failure. However, as will be seen shortly, some models which
demonstrated nothing more than efficient underemployment, have been heralded as having
made the case for involuntary unemployment.
To conclude, it is of great importance to separate two situations: a state where sub-maximal
employment is accompanied with a breaching of the reservation wage principle, on the one
hand, and a state of sub-maximal employment respecting the reservation wage principle, on
the other. To which of these two situations should the involuntary unemployment label be
applied? My personal view is that the first definition is the most apposite, and is the definition
that  Keynes  must  have  had  in  mind.  As  to  the  sub-distinction between individual
disequilibrium and frustration, it must be presumed that, to all intents and purposes, Keynes
had the first of these two variants in mind.8
If this viewpoint is accepted, models demonstrating involuntary unemployment in any sense
other than individual disequilibrium cannot be considered as having fulfilled the first item of
Keynes’s programme.
Figure 1. The four definitions of involuntary unemployment
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4. Full employment, the trouble-making concept
Another source of confusion lies in the notion of full employment, which occurs recurrently in
Keynes’s General Theory as well as in the subsequent literature.
The obvious meaning of this notion is that of the smallest feasible level of unemployment,
defined as the total active labour force minus the employed labour force. As unemployment is
deemed an evil, any decrease in unemployment it is judged to be good news, even if it is
admitted that some irreducible minimum level exists.
Keynes’s mistake in the General Theory is to have failed to realise that he had used the full
employment  notion  in  two  different  senses  in  Chapters  2  and  3.  A  majority  of
macroeconomists, or at least macroeconomists of the first generation, have repeated this
mistake.
In its first meaning, full employment means merely market clearing or equilibrium in the
labour market. Its converse is involuntary unemployment in the reservation wage sense. There
is no objection to be levelled against introducing full employment so understood in the
theoretical discourse, except that it is redundant. If full employment means market clearing
why have two terms for a single occurrence?9
In its second meaning, full employment means the maximal feasible level of employment.
Here, the notion refers to a single, exogenously given, level of employment; an irreducible
level  of  unemployment,  frictional  unemployment,  always  exists.  Whenever  the
unemployment rate is above this frictional level, it is assumed that involuntary unemployment
exists. Clearly, this definition comes closer to the common-sense meaning of the term.
Keynes claimed that these two definitions amounted to the same thing. I strongly disagree.
Let me illustrate the unfortunate consequences of following Keynes in this respect with the
example of Modigliani’s influential 1944 article in which he recast Hicks’s initial model into
what was to become the standard version of the IS−LM model.
1 Unlike Keynes, Modigliani
had no qualms about the idea that involuntary unemployment might be due to nominal wage
rigidity. According to him, the distinctive feature of Keynes’s theory is that it contains a
particular labour supply schedule featuring a perfectly elastic section up to a kink, after which
it becomes upwards sloping.
 For the sake of simplicity, I shall assume that it becomes vertical
at the kink. So, the labour supply curve resembles a reversed image of an L. The employment
level corresponding to the kink is called ‘full employment’. Whenever the demand for labour
intersects the supply schedule on its horizontal section, it is claimed that involuntary
unemployment exists.
At first, this interpretation looks appealing, if only because it echoes Keynes’s remarks about
the sociological factors giving the labour market its specificity. However, upon closer
scrutiny, it turns out to be flawed, as  Figure 2 shows.
The upper graph confirms my claim that the two definitions of full employment do not
coincide. According to the market clearing definition, full employment occurs at point A,
while according to the maximum definition it is at point B. In other words, Figure 2 shows
full employment according to the first definition and a lack of full employment according to
the second! Moreover no involuntary unemployment is present if the reservation definition of
involuntary unemployment is taken. The supply schedule may well have a special shape, but
nonetheless it intersects with the demand schedule.
2 Thus, according to my definitions,
Modigliani’s  model  is  concerned  with  underemployment  rather  than  with  involuntary
unemployment.
                                                   
1 c.f. De Vroey (2000).
2 In terms of the distinction made above, Modigliani confuses rigidity as a characteristic of the market supply
and rigidity as a characteristic of the functioning of the market.10
Figure 2. The reversed-L supply of labour and its choice theoretical foundation
Worse still: using the distinction between dominated and efficient underemployment, we have
efficient underemployment, the trivial and uninteresting case. This observation follows from a
quick examination of the choice theoretical foundation underlying the mirrored-L supply
curve. This reveals that, in the case in point, consumption and leisure are perfect substitutes to
the representative labour supplier. His or her indifference ‘curves’ are linear. Unless the
expected real wage is equal to the absolute value of the slope of the indifference lines, such
cases result in corner solutions. This exception is exactly what happens when the magnitude11
of  the  wage  corresponds  to  the  horizontal  section  of  the  supply  curve:  all  levels  of
employment are equivalent to the labour supplier at this wage. Hence, any increase in
employment along the horizontal section does not affect utility.
The conclusion to be drawn is that Modigliani’s argument rests on a trick. By blurring the two
definitions of full employment (one where the lack of full employment is synonymous with
involuntary unemployment, and the other where the lack of full employment means merely a
non-maximal employment level) the impression is given that involuntary unemployment has
been demonstrated. But this is false.
5. Rigidity
In view of the central role played by the opposing notions of flexibility and rigidity in
economic analysis, it is surprising how little economists have reflected on their definition..
My aim in this section is to fill this gap and to pursue the implications of a better definition
for the theorisation of involuntary unemployment.
First of all, it should always be made clear when discussing rigidity whether the reference is
the real world or the fictitious world of theoretical models. Only the latter will be my concern
here. This restriction made, I propose to define rigidity as a situation where a price or a wage
fails  to  change  when  it  should,  due  some  external  impediment  to  the  formation  of
equilibrium.
3 In turn, flexibility is said to prevail when no such impediment is present. The
central point to be kept in mind is that both notions ought to be related to the formation of
equilibrium. Sluggishness, stickiness and slow adjustment will be treated as synonymous
terms designating situations where a change in a price or a wage is observed, although not to
the full extent required for equilibrium. Several qualifications of this definition are needed.
The standard definition
My definition differs from the type of definition to be found in the New Keynesian literature.
For example Hahn and Solow give the following definition:
Nominal wage rates are flexible if they rise pretty promptly and rapidly when there is
excess demand for labour and fall pretty promptly and rapidly when there is excess
supply of labour (Hahn and Solow, 1986: 1).
4
Here rigidity is associated with the fact that the labour market fails to clear. Hence the claim
that efficiency wage models (the case that Hahn and Solow have in mind) display rigidity.
                                                   
3 Henceforth special attention will be paid to wages.
4 Another example is the same vein is from Mankiw’s Macroeconomics textbook, where wage rigidity is defined
as ‘the failure of wages to adjust until labour supply equals labour demand’ (1997: 129).12
But, according to my definition, such a characterisation is misplaced, since nothing in these
models impedes the formation of equilibrium. Hence, according to my definition, wages
should be considered flexible rather than rigid in these models. The flaw in Hahn and Solow’s
type of definition is that it mistakenly presumes that only rigidity can explain market
rationing. As a result, the absence of market clearing (rather than the existence of an obstacle
to equilibrium) is the benchmark for rigidity, thereby allowing rigidity to co-exist with
equilibrium, which is odd. If efficiency wage models are characterised as featuring rigidity,
then any equilibrium model must be considered alike since, once the equilibrium is attained,
values remain unchanged as long as no new shocks arise.
Rigidity as an individual experiment versus rigidity as a market experiment
Another pitfall that must be avoided consists in representing wage rigidity as a specially
shaped labour supply curve. This, it will be seen presently, was Modigliani’s mistake.
Rigidity as understood in my definition refers to a market outcome, and not to a characteristic
of its component elements, either the demand or the supply function. Patinkin’s distinction
between an individual and a market experiment (Patinkin, 1965: 11−12; 387−392) can be
evoked here. Rigidity viewed as an individual experiment means that a given agent does not
change his or her optimal quantity choice when prices differ. Although this feature expresses
itself in a specially shaped supply or demand function, it does not impede the formation of
equilibrium; however the opposite is true whenever rigidity is understood as a market
experiment.
Time and trade organisation assumptions
Any theoretical discussion as to the nature and impact of rigidity must take into account the
assumptions made about time and trade organisation underpinning the theoretical model in
which the claim is made. Usually, these models belong either to the Marshallian or the
Walrasian traditions. These have in common the assumption that trade takes place within
well-delineated trade rounds. In the Walrasian approach the trade round refers to a given
tâtonnement process organised by the auctioneer and leading to the formation of a dated
temporary equilibrium. In the Marshallian approach, the idea of a trade round is associated
with the formation of market equilibrium on a given market day. These two set-ups can be
subsumed under John Hicks’s ‘week’ time device where it is assumed that trade occurs on
Mondays, the rest of the week serving to implementing the contracts struck on Mondays.
As a result, the notions of flexibility and rigidity must be split according to whether they
pertain to a given trade round (i.e. a given Monday) or to a sequence of trade rounds. In other13
words, a distinction must be drawn between trade round rigidity and rigidity across trade
rounds, the same being true for flexibility.
5 Strictly speaking, one should never speak simply
of rigidity or flexibility, without specifying the time period involved; unfortunately this is a
principle that is more honoured in the breach than in the observance.
A further implication is worth noting. As soon as the week device is adopted, the duration of
the  formation of equilibrium on any Monday is of merely incidental importance. Slow
adjustment may result in the attainment of equilibrium late on Monday, but this will have no
impact because the implementation of decisions made on Mondays only starts on Tuesdays.
Hence it makes no difference whether Monday’s equilibrium is attained quickly or slowly, as
long as it is attained.
 On the other hand, were it accepted that the adjustment process could
still be unfinished by Monday midnight, the week framework would collapse. Applying
Occam’s razor, the formation of an equilibrium on Monday should be considered as arising in
logical time.
Slow adjustment
Several Keynesian authors have invoked slow adjustment as the cause of involuntary
unemployment:
Keynesians believe that goods markets and, especially, labour markets respond only
sluggishly to shocks, i.e. that prices and wages do not move quickly to clear markets.
(Blinder, [1988] 1997: 111)
I shall argue that Keynesian macroeconomics neither asserts nor requires nominal wage
and/or price rigidity. It does assert and require that markets not be instantaneously and
continuously cleared by prices. That is a much less restrictive assumption, and much
less controversial. (Tobin, [1993] 1997: 136).
In retrospect, the post-war consensus was a consensus about two main beliefs. … The
second main belief was indeed that prices and wages did not adjust very quickly to clear
markets. (Blanchard, 1987: 634).
I believe that real wage rigidity — not in the sense that there is no adjustment, but in the
sense that the adjustment is slow — is the essence of what is valid in Keynesian
economics. (Modigliani in an interview with Feiwell [Feiwell 1989: 570]).
However, these statements should not be accepted at face value. Only a few authors, notably
Patinkin (1965) and Leijonhufvud (1968), have really attempted to demonstrate the existence
                                                   
5 The point in time and the inter-temporal cases are not necessarily equivalent. It is possible that rigidity at the
trade round level co-exists with flexibility across them. However, the co-existence of trade-round flexibility with
across-trade-rounds rigidity looks less plausible.14
of a causal link between slow adjustment and market non-clearance  with, as I show in my
book, little success. Most models devised by economists who emphasise the slow adjustment
claim in their commentaries, are actually based on the exogenous rigid price assumption. This
is small wonder if my characterisation of the week device as allowing the functioning of the
trade round to be conceived of as taking place in logical time is accepted. In this context, slow
adjustment is automatically excluded as far as the operation of Mondays is concerned
although it is relevant for the adjustment across weeks. Therefore, slow adjustment cannot be
evoked as the cause of involuntary unemployment.
Did Keynes succeed in getting rid of the wage rigidity assumption?
Keynes made the nominal wage rigidity assumption in Chapter 3 of the General Theory.
While he retained this assumption for most of the book, this, he claimed, was of little
consequence since it was eventually to be dropped in Chapter 19. The last issue that I want to
consider here is whether Keynes’s claim as to his Chapter 19 removal of the wage rigidity
assumption is valid.
6
The question tackled by Keynes in Chapter 19 (1936: 260) is ‘what effect on unemployment
will a reduction in money wage have?’ Unfortunately, this question is ill-framed. A twofold
clarification is needed. First, we need to make clear whether this question relates to the real
world or the fictitious theoretical universe. As to the issue of whether decreases in nominal
wages succeeded in decreasing mass unemployment during the Great Depression, many
economists will concur that it did not. But what counts is to generate this result in the
theoretical model. Second, as claimed above, it is necessary to separate adjustment as
pertaining to a given trade round (‘Monday adjustment’) and adjustment across trade rounds
(‘adjustment across Mondays’). The rigidity factor in need of removal in order to substantiate
Keynes’s claim pertains to the former adjustment process. That is, the alleged removal must
consist in a replacement of the ‘Monday rigidity’ by ‘Monday flexibility’ assumption.
Involuntary unemployment must occur in a given trade round, the point at issue being to
demonstrate that it can arise even when there is ‘Monday flexibility’.
Against this background, it turns out that Keynes unwittingly resorted to a trick. Outward
claims  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding,  Keynes’s  reasoning  is  not  concerned  with  a
replacement of rigidity by flexibility within a given trade round. His discussion bears on a
different topic, namely the pros and cons of variations over time in an exogenous rigid wage.
The issue of how trade round wages are formed is sidestepped. In other words, the question
addressed is: ‘will employment increase if an exogenous wage floor decreases from t
0 to t
1, an
                                                   
6 Keynes’s motivation is not at issue. It is obvious that he did not like having involuntary unemployment
explained by an exogenous rigid wage. The point is to assess whether he was able to implement his objective.15
exogenously rigid wage being assumed for each trading round, but possibly a different one at
each round?’ Keynes may well have clinched a point in stating that inter-temporally rigid
wages are more desirable than inter-temporally flexible wages, but this is hardly tantamount
to removing the Monday rigidity assumption, as he claims to have done. So, contrary to what
Keynes and several Keynesian authors  especially Patinkin (1987)  have suggested, the
rigid wage assumption fails to be removed from the trade round analysis, the proper context in
which the appearance of involuntary unemployment must be dealt with.
6. New Keynesian models
My next task is to assess how ‘new’ Keynesians, as opposed to ‘old’ ones such as Modigliani,
have fared in achieving Keynes’s programme. The following models have been studied:
Azariadis’s implicit  contract  model  (1975),  Shapiro  and  Stiglitz’s  efficiency  wages  or
shirking  model  (1984),  three  coordination  failures  models  (Diamond’s  ([1982]  1991),
Howitt’s (1985) and Roberts’s (1987)), and two imperfect competition models (Hart’s
([1982] 1991) and Blanchard and Kiyotaki’s ([1987] 1991)). A summary of my conclusions
follows.
Azariadis’s implicit contract model and Shapiro and Stiglitz’s efficiency wage or shirking
model
These  two  models  can  be  considered  together because they succeed in demonstrating
involuntary unemployment in the reservation wage sense. This is quite a feat, the realisation
of which had to wait for several decades after the General  Theory. Azariadis’ model is
however more ad hoc than Shapiro and Stiglitz’s. Unfortunately, these models relinquish the
individual disequilibrium aim by giving involuntary unemployment the milder meaning of a
state where the unemployed are frustrated and jealous of the employed. The unemployed are
in a state of individual equilibrium since employment is distributed through a lottery in which
agents find it optimal to participate, even at the risk of ending up unemployed.
To  cap  it  all,  the  success  of  efficiency  wage  models  in  demonstrating  involuntary
unemployment has a ring of Pyrrhic victory. That is, when, at last, Keynes’s  aim  of
demonstrating involuntary unemployment is achieved, it turns out that this does not serve the
purpose that Keynes had in mind! No state-led demand activation is required. Moreover, it
should  be  noted  that  in  best-known  efficiency  wage  model,  the  shirking  model,
unemployment is not a problem in need of a solution. Instead it is the solution to a problem,
namely shirking.16
Coordination failures models
Here a distinction must be made about Diamond’s search model and Howitt’s transaction
costs model, on the one hand, and Roberts’s model, on the other. The first two models are
closely related since they are based on the idea that an increase in the level of activity makes
trade easier. With respect to the achievement of Keynes’s programme, they fare alike. On the
negative side, they fail to demonstrate involuntary unemployment. On the positive side, they
succeed in demonstrating dominated underemployment. Moreover, they are able to meet two
other items of Keynes’s programme, the demand activation justification and the exoneration
of wage rigidity  from causing the problem. Wages are perfectly flexible in these models.
Roberts’s model is different as it departs more radically from Walrasian trade technology.
This  allows  him  to  demonstrate  involuntary  unemployment  in  the  reservation  wage.
Moreover, the individual disequilibrium feature is also present. This remarkable result
confirms a claim that I make in the book, namely that the main stumbling block to obtaining
an involuntary unemployment result lies in the centralised trade technology assumptions on
which both Marshallian and Walrasian models are based. Unfortunately, Roberts’s model fails
as far as the justification of demand activation is concerned.
Imperfect competition models
Hart’s model is a static general equilibrium model with imperfect competition based on a
Cournot−Nash  conception  of  equilibrium.  While  it  is  highly  original  as  a  theoretical
contribution, it is hardly successful when it comes to realising Keynes’s programme. It fails
on most scores, although it is a success as far as the exoneration of wage rigidity is concerned.
Hart’s model is basically a dominated underemployment model but its justification for
demand activation is contrived. Blanchard and Kiyotaki develop a model of monopolistic
competition à la Chamberlin. Resting on the nominal wage rigidity assumption, it can be
viewed as a modern reincarnation of Modigliani’s model. Its distinctive advantage is to
provide a justification of demand activation policy and a rebuttal of Friedman and Lucas’s
claim as to the inefficiency of monetary expansion.
Let me now reflect on the similarities and differences between these various models. They can
be regrouped as follows. Implicit contract and efficiency wage models should be put in the
first class. They succeed in demonstrating involuntary unemployment at the reservation wage
(yet without the individual disequilibrium connotation) but are less successful with most of
the other items on the programme, except the exoneration of wage rigidity. All the other
models,  with  the  exception  of  Roberts’s,  wittingly  or  not,  abandon  the  involuntary
unemployment objective in favour of the dominated underemployment aim. In so doing, they17
salvage the system failure idea and the demand activation objective. This second group of
models can be further sub-divided. On the one hand, we have coordination failures models
maintaining the perfect competition framework and privileging the wage flexibility line. On
the other, we have the imperfect competition models. Finally, Roberts’s model forms a group
on  its  own.  It  must  be  credited with having succeeded in achieving Keynes’s  aim  of
demonstrating  involuntary  unemployment,  including  its  individual  disequilibrium
connotation. Unfortunately, it suffers from two drawbacks. First, it does not fully succeed in
achieving Keynes’s programme since it fails on the score of justifying demand activation.
Second, its success in demonstrating involuntary unemployment turns out to be a one-shot
victory: so what if the possibility of involuntary unemployment has been demonstrated? No
real research programme ensues.
My investigation leads me to the conclusion that no model fully succeeds in achieving
Keynes’s programme. Table 1 summarises the successes and failures. While several models
succeed with all of except one of the items, none reaches the full score.
How should this result be interpreted? My opinion is that, seven decades after the publication
of the General Theory, the most plausible explanation is that Keynes’s programme is just not
feasible. At least one of its elements is always too much.
None  of  the  authors  studied  have adopted  this  standpoint with reference to Keynes’s
programme. If they had, they would have stated that their departure from this programme
stems from their realisation that it could not be implemented, and from their feeling the need
to replace it by a more feasible programme. If this viewpoint is accepted, my analysis resolves
two standard enigmas in the history of Keynesian economics. The first is why Keynesian
theories, departing from Keynes’s own way of putting issues, have emerged. They did, it can
now be asserted, because Keynes’s programme was impossible. The second conundrum is
why, if Keynes’s programme has to be amended, has it not been replaced by a single
alternative programme, rallying all Keynesian economists? Why, in other words, are there
competing Keynesian theories? Here again, the answer is simple. Once it is admitted that
some  departure  from  Keynes’s  programme  is  necessary,  several  alternatives  present
themselves, according to the points in the programme that are shelved. It is then hardly
surprising that different Keynesian theories co-exist. They all have a common lineage in
Keynes’s programme and there is no reason to argue that one particular departure is superior
to another.
7. Is involuntary unemployment worth fighting for?
Beyond doubt, the main difficulty standing in the way of the realisation of Keynes’s
programme lies in demonstrating involuntary unemployment in the individual disequilibrium18
sense. This raises the last issue that I wish to address  should Keynesian economists
continue to strive to demonstrate involuntary unemployment in its strong meaning? The point
is not that such a demonstration is impossible but rather whether it is the best path to take.
The main motivation behind Keynesian economists’ attempts to introduce involuntary
unemployment in economic theory is their belief that it is an important fact of life. For
example, Shapiro and Stiglitz write
To us, involuntary unemployment is a real and important phenomenon with grave social
consequences that needs to be explained and understood (1985: 1217).
This belief is shared by most Keynesian economists.
 They are convinced that, out there in the
real world, something exists which deserves to be called involuntary unemployment, and has
the features mentioned above, especially that people are unemployed through no fault of their
own.
 Hence their desire to introduce this concept into the theoretical discourse. But, as my
analysis has shown, every time they try to do this, they stumble over daunting obstacles.
What explains the difficulty of constructing a theory of involuntary unemployment? Is it, as
argued by Lucas, that the “thing” to be explained doesn’t exist, or is it due to some deeply
embedded premise of economic theory? My own view tilts towards the latter. Economic
theory is concerned with fictitious parables. The premises upon which it is based have the
advantage of allowing tractable, rigorous theorising, but the price of this is that important
facts of life are excluded from the theoretical universe. Non-chosen outcomes is one of them.
The underlying reason lies in the trade technology and information assumptions upon which
both  the  Walrasian  and  the  Marshallian  (and  the  neo-Walrasian  and  neo-Marshallian)
approaches are based. This is a central conclusion of my inquiry: the stumbling block to the
introduction of involuntary unemployment lies in the assumptions about trade technology that
are usually adopted in economic theory.1920
Foregoing the involuntary unemployment claim may look like a high price to pay, particularly
if it is admitted that good reasons exist for believing in its real world relevance. But would its
abandonment really be so dramatic? Several arguments suggest that it might not be so.
First of all, the elimination of this concept would only affect the theoretical sphere. Drawing
conclusions from this sphere about the real world would be a mistake. No jumps should be
made from the world of theory to the real world, or vice-versa. On the one hand, the real
world existence of involuntary unemployment should not be denied merely on the grounds
that there is no place for this concept in the theoretical discourse. On the other, the fact that
solid arguments can be put forward as to its real world existence is not a sufficient condition
to give involuntary unemployment theoretical legitimacy. Admittedly, this position makes
sense only if it is accepted, as I believe it should be, that a sharp divide must be drawn
between the real world and the fictitious theoretical universe. Unfortunately the principle of
such a separation is admitted neither by Keynesians nor by the new classicists. The latter have
not hesitated to transpose the theoretical non-existence of involuntary unemployment into the
real world. The Keynesians’ mistake is that they have over-stated their case: while their model
only demonstrates either involuntary unemployment in the narrow frustration meaning or
dominated underemployment meaning, they behave as if they had succeeded in giving an
explanation of involuntary unemployment in its strong meaning.
Second, the reasons for dismissing involuntary unemployment should be taken into account,
i.e. both the rationality assumption and the centralised trade technology and information
assumptions. These are defensible on the grounds of tractability and the lack of better
alternatives. Still, there is nothing to boast about in their adoption. Their only justification is
expediency. If involuntary unemployment is deemed to be theoretically unacceptable only on
such grounds, there is less reason to make a fuss over its dismissal.
Third, the issue at stake is whether the demonstration of involuntary unemployment should
have priority over the other points in Keynes’s programme once it is admitted that they are on
a collision course. To Keynes, the concept of involuntary unemployment was instrumental in
the realisation of a larger cause, namely the denunciation of a system failure and the
vindication of state intervention in the economy. If this concept has been an object of
controversy, it is mainly because it was a metaphor for the wider judgment to be made on the
efficiency of a competitive market system, and of the opportunities for state intervention in it.
Wanting to defend the involuntary unemployment concept thus amounted to taking a sceptical
stance on the virtues of laissez  faire. Similarly, opposition to the idea of involuntary
unemployment would stem from supporting laissez faire. This is the real issue in the dispute.21
But this debate does not necessarily need the involuntary unemployment concept. If this point
is accepted, it is not necessary, in the present state of economic theory, to stick too firmly to
the view that involuntary unemployment is the sine qua non of Keynesian theory.
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